Arcana ARCANA/GOVERNANCE index 03 · RISK CLASSES ¬Authorized(q) ¬Executed(q)
~/arcana/governance/risk.md
03

RISK CLASSES

Four levels, four intent requirements

Severity decides how much proof a request owes before it may execute. The ladder runs from read-only inspection to actions that can move the outside world.

[ CRITICAL ]git push · deploy · policy modification · external consequential sendExact explicit approval plus all other controls
[ HIGH ]Process execution, deletion, sensitive mutationActive contract criterion and exact capability
[ MODERATE ]Ordinary writes, bounded executionDirect user request or explicit approval, per policy
[ LOW ]Read-only inspectionOptional binding — still subject to workspace & provenance policy
/governance/risk.md
# 03 · Risk Classes

> Four levels, four intent requirements.

## Overview

Not every action owes the same proof. Reading a file is not pushing to a
remote. Every AuthorizationRequest carries a **riskClass**, and that class
sets the minimum controls that must be satisfied before the PEP will act.
The class is assigned by policy and tool configuration — never chosen by the
model.

## The ladder

### CRITICAL — irreversible, externally consequential

Examples: `git push`, deploy pipelines, policy modification, sending data to
an external service, publishing, rotating credentials.

Requirement: **exact explicit approval plus all other controls** — a valid
capability, an active intent binding, clean provenance, and a human-approved
request hash whose approval is claimed atomically at execution time.

### HIGH — destructive or sensitive mutation

Examples: process execution, file deletion, database writes, modifying
CI configuration, installing packages.

Requirement: **active contract criterion AND exact capability**. The action
must be demanded by the current objective, and the agent must hold a grant
covering precisely this action/resource pair.

### MODERATE — ordinary writes

Examples: creating/editing project files, bounded script execution, local
commits.

Requirement: direct user request or explicit approval, depending on policy.

### LOW — read-only inspection

Examples: reading files, searching code, listing directories, analysis.

Requirement: optional intent binding — but still fully subject to workspace
containment and provenance policy. LOW is *less* proof, never *less*
containment.

## Design rules

1. **The model cannot downgrade its own risk class.** Reframing a deletion as
   "cleanup" changes nothing; the class comes from policy.
2. **Classes compose with approvals.** CRITICAL actions require approval even
   when every other control passes.
3. **Unknown risk fails closed.** A tool without an assigned class is treated
   as HIGH until policy says otherwise.

## Related

- Previous: [PDP ⇄ PEP Split](/governance/pdp-pep.md)
- Next: [Intent–Action Binding](/governance/intent.md)